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Reaction to the Wildcat Strike - The
Employer's Dilemma
AS A RESULT of intensive and often heated negotiations, most
labor contracts currently contain provisions prohibiting em-
ployees from resorting to a strike or work stoppage as a means of
applying leverage during the life of the contract.- A necessary com-
panion clause generally gives to the employer the power to disci-
pline any employee who violates the "no-strike" pledge.2 Both
union and company alike have recognized that these confederate
clauses are mutually advantageous and vital to the maintenance of
industrial peace and stability. By prohibiting the use of the wildcat
strike, both parties are making a concerted effort to create an atmos-
phere where an ongoing harmonious relationship between manage-
ment and labor can be maintained, and where future good-faith
bargaining can occur in a climate free from mutual hostility. Owing
to the vital role which the no-strike clause plays in preserving in-
dustrial stability, it is imperative that the employer have sufficient
power to implement the authority for which he has bargained - the
power to react incisively to a wildcat strike and deal firmly with
those who participate.
In response to an illegal strike, the employer has two goals: end-
ing the work stoppage as soon as possible in order to resume effi-
dent production and fulfill obligations to customers; and (perhaps
more important) preventing the occurrence of any similar incidents
in the future. In achieving these two ultimate aims, there are two
courses of action which are most effective: (1) securing an injunc-
tion to quiddy bring to an end the unauthorized walkout; and (2)
selectively discharging participants in the strike, thus setting an ex-
ample of company intolerance of contract violations which will tend
to deter future walkouts.
I A typical contract provision might read: There shall be no strikes, lockouts, stop-
pages of work, or picketing during the life of this agreement.
2 For example: Any employee participating in an unauthorized strike, slowdown,
walkout or any other interference of work shall be subject to disciplinary action. Or:
The company shall have the right to discharge or otherwise discipline any employee
who does engage in a strike, organized slowdown, or work stoppage.
By so empowering the employer to take direct action to redress an illegal walkout,
employees are encouraged to resort to the grievance procedures, including arbitration,
rather than to an illegal strike.
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In order to gauge the success of employer efforts to preserve the
vitality of the no-strike clause as a meaningful device for promoting
industrial stability, this Note will examine the response of the courts
to employer demands for injunctive relief to end wildcat strikes and
the response of arbitrators toward selective discharge as a means of
discouraging repeated disregard for contract terms.
I. INJUNCTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
A. Availability of Injunctive Relief in Federal Courts
The obvious purpose of the no-strike pledge is to insure indus-
trial peace by carrying out the conciliatory measures dictated in the
contract.' Indeed, the no-strike clause is the "quid pro quo" granted
by the union to the employer for the employer's agreement to arbi-
trate disputes arising under the contract.4 In the landmark Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills5 decision, the Supreme Court announced
that the paramount federal interest in maintaining stability in labor
relations would be best served by strict enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements.6 Certainly it would seem that a national pol-
icy concerned with vouchsafing "the fruits of a bargain which the
parties have finally arrived at through the exercise of collective bar-
gaining rights"7 would favor the issuance of an injunction where the
fundamental no-strike pledge of a collective bargaining agreement has
been breached. Yet, a review of the court decisions discloses that
the employer has been effectly foreclosed from the much needed in-
junction remedy.
The federal rule respecting the issuance of an injunction to end
a strike in violation of a no-strike clause was enunciated in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson.8 In Sinclair the employer sought an in-
junction in a federal court after nine illegal slowdowns and work
stoppages within a 19-month period had severly damaged business
operations. Despite an explicit no-strike provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, the Court held that no injunction could issue
3 See Teamsters v. McMaken Transp. Co., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960).
4 See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court added
that section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 185 (1964),
allowing suit for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement in the federal courts
"authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective bargaining agreements .... Id. at 451.
5 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
61d.
7 Teamsters v. McMaken Transp. Co., 282 F.2d 345, 350 (10th Cir. 1960).
8370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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because the situation fell within section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act which deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunc-
tions in peaceful labor disputes. Reasoning that the grant of juris-
diction in section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act'0 had not repealed the
injunction prohibition contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Court concluded that any alteration of the fundamental policy
against injunctions in peaceful labor disputes was wholly within the
domain of Congress and not the courts.'1 Although the Court indi-
cated that the right to sue under section 301 would be worth far
more if companies could get federal court injunctions to bar a breach
of their collective bargaining agreements," it reached the decision
that it was bound by the legislative history and the language of sec-
tion 301'3 to conclude that that provision had not disturbed the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act's ban on injunctions against strikes arising out of
a "labor dispute."
In a cogent dissent,' Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that the
decision of the majority conflicted with their avowed policy of ad-
0 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964). The pertinent language states:
No court of the United States shall have any jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person .. . from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment; . ..
e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence; ...
i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or vio-
lence the acts heretofore specified ....
10 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964), which reads:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citi-
zenship of the parties.
Subsection (b) of section 301 provides that judgments for money damages against a
union are enforceable against the union's assets and not the individual members.
1lSinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 212 (1962). Although the Court
had issued an injunction under section 301 in the Lincoln Mills decision, it was only
a mandatory injunction specifically enforcing an agreement to arbitrate, and not an in-
junction restraining a strike so as to invoke the policies of Norris-LaGuardia.
12Id. at 214.
13 Id. at 205-10. The Court used as their indicia the fact that a provision expressly
repealing the anti-injunction provision was dropped before passage, and the statement
of one of the Act's authors, Senator Taft, that, "fthe conferees ... rejected the repeal
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. at 208.
14Id. at 215.
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herence to arbitration commitments,15 and that the strict application
of Norris-LaGuardia threatened the very vitality of these arbitration
provisions. In deference to the national policy favoring strict en-
forcement of arbitration agreements announced in Lincoln Mills,
Mr. Justice Brennan would read section 301 as giving the district
courts "their regular arsenal of remedies [appropriate] to the situa-
tion,"1 including the injunction.
In light of the clear language of Norris-LaGuardia Act section
4 and the failure of Congress to explicitly repeal the anti-injunction
proviso in enacting section 301, it cannot be claimed that Sinclair
decision was clearly erroneous. However, it is obvious that the ex-
ceedingly literal reading given the relevant statutes by the Sinclair
Court departs markedly from the broad policy analysis of Lincoln
Mills. The enjoining of a strike over a grievance that can be set-
tled by arbitration may well be "indispensable to the effective en-
forcement of an arbitration scheme in a collective bargaining agree-
ment."'17 Indeed, enjoining a strike over a grievance which is subject
to arbitration would not offend the underlying policy of Norris-La-
Guardia - "the avoidance of judicial evaluation of the social and
economic justification for strikes."'18 By refusing to allow federal
courts to enjoin wildcat strikes, the Court has gone a long way
towards rendering the no-strike pledge nugatory; without the injunc-
tion as a sanction, the employee subject to the contract remains free
to violate its terms with impunity.1" Sinclair effected a sharp limi-
tation on the federal policy promoting industrial stability through
the strict enforcement of arbitration clauses contained in collective
151d. at 225. The federal policy favoring arbitration was clearly established in
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), which was followed by Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
16 Sindair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 220 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
17 Marshall, Section 301-Problems and Prospects, in LABOR ARBITRATION AND IN-
DUSTAL CHANGE 146, 153 (1963) (Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of
the National Academy of Arbitrators).
18 111 U. PA. L. REV. 247, 252 (1962).
19 See Comment, Quid Pro Quo in Federal Labor Law: Enforcement of the No-Strike
Clause, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 626, 631 (1963). An excellent argument in favor of the
view that the Norris-LaGuardia injunction prohibition should not apply to section 301
suits is presented in 111 U. PA. L. REv. 247, 251-52 (1962):
In enacting section 301, Congress meant to give employers some means of en-
forcing union contract promises; the union right to sue was regarded as purely
secondary .... A better approach ... is to weigh the desirability of an in-
junction to effectuate arbitration against the harm done to the anti-injunction
policy of Norris LaGuardia ....
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bargaining agreements. This constraint has proved quite damaging
to employers.20
B. Availability of Injunctive Relief in State Courts
As Mr. Justice Brennan anticipated,2' Sinclair caused employers
to look to state courts for the remedy which they could not get in
the federal courts.m A conflict arose concerning whether state
courts were divested of jurisdiction over strike injunction suits.
Some courts continued to grant injunctions, maintaining that the
right to injunctive relief for breach of contract where damages were
inadequate was a state-created right, not subject to federal preemp-
tion.m Other courts sought to avoid a situation where the choice of
forum would determine the availability of injunctive relief24 and de-
nied the remedy in order to further the federal labor policy25
This conflict was recently resolved by the Supreme Court in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, International Association of Machin-
ists.2 60 Although not specifically deciding whether Sinclair extended
2 0 The grievance procedure is worth little if employees can walk out and still claim
protection under the grievance procedure. In fact, it was for the very purpose of pre-
venting such destructive self-action that the grievance procedure was established. See
text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
2 1 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
2 2 See Comment, The Availability of State Remedies in Section 301 Cases: Injunc-
tive Relief, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 580, 584-85 (1964), where it is stated that "to allow
the state courts to freely use this [injunction] remedy would be tantamount to allowing
substantive rights to exist in state courts which would not be available in the federal
courts under the applicable federal laws."
2 3 See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965) (Sinclair only governs if action originally brought
in federal district court under section 301); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932
(1958) (simply because injunctive relief is unavailable in federal courts does not pre-
clude granting such relief in state courts); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964); C.D. Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331
(Sup. Ct. 1963), affd, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965) (the Sinclair
decision did not hold that the prohibition against injunctions applied to state courts).
See also Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Con-
tracts: Beyond Norris LaGuardia, 79 HARV. L REV. 757 (1966).
24 See Stern, The Norris LaGuardia Act and State Court Injunctions against Strikes
in Breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement under Section 301: Accommodation v.
Incompatibility, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 67 (1965).
2 5 See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAW, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); Oman Constr. Co. v. Teamsters Local 327, 263 F. Supp.
181 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting Eng'rs, 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Texas
1963); Crestwood Dairy v. Kelly, 222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). The need for
uniformity between federal and state courts was also recognized in Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962);
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 375 U.S. 335 (1962).
26 390 U.S. 557 (1968). For a thorough discussion of the Avco decision and its
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to state courts and eliminated the availability of injunctions in a state
proceeding, 7 the Avco Court rendered that question effectively
moot by its holding that a state court action by an employer seeking
to enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike clause falls within the
jurisdictional grant of section 301 and hence is properly removable
to a federal court under section 1441 (b) of the judicial Code.28
Once the action has been removed, the federal court is compelled to
apply the federal substantive law of labor relations which, under
Sinclair, requires dismissal of the employer's claim for injunctive re-
lief.29  Since the employer's action in the state court will always be
removable where the industry involved "affects interstate com-
merce,"30 the employer is effectively foreclosed from the injunction
remedy in both judicial systems.31
federal jurisdiction ramifications in particular, see Recent Decision, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 460 (1969).
2 7 The court of appeals in Avco did direct itself to this question, however, and con-
cluded that "the remedies available in state courts are limited to remedies available under
federal law." Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAM, 376 F.2d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1967).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (1964) provides that:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties.
29 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
3029 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964) (Taft-Hartley Act § 301). Since the union itself
often has a great deal to lose by a wildcat strike, it might be argued that unions could
put an end to the strike by consciously failing to effect removal in a state court which
is disposed not to follow the federal injunction policy. However, although such a ploy
by the union is theoretically possible, the union's failure to exhaust the legal remedies
of the rank and file would surely cause extensive political difficulties for the union.
Hence, it is unlikely that employer actions seeking to enjoin a wildcat strike will not
be removed.
The union might lose its rights to remove through inadvertence by failing to peti-
tion for removal within 30 days from the day the employer files his complaint. 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1964). However, such failure is unlikely in an action seeking an
injunction where time is always of the essence.
31 Whether state courts still have the authority to issue injunctions when removal
is not effected is still an unanswered question. Although the Court did not reach the
question in Sinclair or Avco, section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act denies "jurisdiction"
to the "court[s] of the United States," and thus a literal reading of the statute would
suggest that state courts are not deprived of their traditional equity jurisdiction. How-
ever, notwithstanding the fact that section 4 speaks in terms of withholding federal court
jurisdiction, it is beyond dispute that the statute's operative effect is more substantive
than procedural owing to the immense importance of the injunction remedy in deter-
mining the success or failure of a strike effort. See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collec-
tive Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1035 (1963),
Once the mandate of section 4 has been adopted as part of the federal substantive law
of labor relations under section 301, state courts would be forced to yield to the dom-
inant federal policy in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction. See Comment, The
Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 301 of the Taft-Hartly Act - Problems of Jurisdic-
tion and Removal in the Enforceability of Collectively Bargained No-Strike Agreements,
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In the absence of congressional action to the contrary, the com-
pany is, for all practical purposes, effectively barred from obtaining
an injunction in either a federal or state court. Given the unavail-
ability of injunctive relief to end a strike, the employer necessarily
becomes solely dependent upon his contract right to discipline con-
tract violators as a means of preventing the reoccurrence of illegal
work stoppages. The next section of this Note examines the extent
to which arbitrators have enforced the employer's theoretically un-
fettered power to discipline wildcat strikers, the contract right which
was often the inducement for the employer's agreement to the con-
tract terms.
II. DISCIPLINING THE WILDCAT STRIKER -
THE ARBITRATOR'S RESPONSE
A. Federal Policy Favoring the Binding Authority of Arbitration
It has long been the federal policy to severely limit court author-
ity in matters of contract interpretation, 2 leaving the resolution of
industrial disputes to the independent consideration of the arbitrator
within the framework of the grievance procedure set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement. Favoring the intent of the parties
to erect a system of industrial self-government, the Supreme Court
has decided that all doubts concerning the propriety of the settle-
ment should be resolved in favor of arbitration.38 Given the "hands
off" policy of the federal courts with respect to the finality of ar-
bitration decisions 4 and the overall policy favoring their strict en-
forcement, the arbitrator has a great responsibility to faithfully
discharge his duties by a strict adherence to the contract and the no-
strike clause contained therein.
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 489, 501 (1965). The policies fostering a uniform national labor
policy announced in Lincoln Mills, reinforced in Sinclair and Avco, militate against the
availability of injunctive relief in state courts when similar relief is unavailable in the
federal courts. In any event, although the question of the direct applicability of section
4 to the states remains unresolved, the ease with which an injunction suit can in a state
court be removed renders the question of direct applicability somewhat academic.
3 2 This policy was set forth in one of the cases in the famous Steelworkers Trilogy:
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
33 See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
3 4IThe policy of not substituting the court's discretion for that of the arbitrator is
enunciated in the third case in the Trilogy - Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also Issacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitra-
tion and the No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914 (1962).
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B. Discharge of the Wildcat Strike Instigator
It is well-settled arbitral authority that where the specific indi-
vidual or individuals who actually instigated a wildcat strike can be
identified, they are subject to summary discharge."5 By assuming a
leadership role in a proscribed activity, an employee voluntarily ex-
poses himself to the risk that when the strike is over, he may have
to pay for the consequences for his inflammatory conduct with the
loss of his job. Unless the employer is afforded considerable lati-
tude in disciplining the instigator, the no-strike provision would be
rendered completely meaningless. Recognizing the gravity of fo-
menting a wildcat strike, the arbitrator has given the instigator little
protection when identified by the employer to the arbitrator's satis-
faction.36
C. Discharge of Strike Participants When There is a
Basis for Differentiation
Although it is often impossible to identify the actual instigators
of a wildcat strike, the employer will nonetheless be allowed to ex-
ecute unequal penalties on those who have taken a more active role
in the strike or have otherwise distinguished themselves as strong
proponents of the illegal activity.37 Thus arbitrators have relied on
3 5 See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 487 (1968); Wells Mfg. Co., 49 Lab. Arb.
1189 (1968); Kaiser Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 507 (1967); Pullman-Standard, 47
Lab. Arb. 752 (1966); Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 585 (1965); Deere
& Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 182 (1964); General Am. Transp. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 142 (1964);
Mack Truck Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 1240 (1964); American Hard Rubber Co., 41 Lab. Arb.
155 (1963); Ford Motor Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 609 (1963); Pettibone Mullikin Corp., 41
Lab. Arb. 110 (1963); Pullman Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 607 (1963); Homer Laughlin
China Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1216 (1963); Insulrock Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 169 (1962); Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 72 (1958); Chrysler Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 562 (1958);
Wesson Oil & Snow Drift Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 622 (1957); Bower Roller Bearing Co.,
22 Lab. Arb. 320 (1954); Borg-Warner Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 589 (1954); Alan Wood
Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 843 (1954); International Harvester Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 239
(1953); Shenandoa Rayon Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 421 (1953); Inland Steel Co., 19 Lab.
Arb. 601 (1952); Gardner-Denver Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 829 (1951); International Har-
vester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 610 (1949); Everett Dyers & Cleaners, 11 Lab. Arb. 462
(1948); Carnegie Illinois Steel Corp., 5 Lab. Arb. 363 (1946).
36 It should be pointed out that many arbitrators allow the employer considerable
latitude in ascertaining the identity of strike instigators. See, e.g., United States Steel
Corp., 50 Lab. Arb. 472 (1968) ("Employees who promote strike activity and so are
disciplined cannot escape responsibility merely because it later appears that others may
have been equally guilty . I..." Id. at 476). Deere & Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 182 (1964)
(discharge of instigators upheld on evidence that they did quantitatively more picketing
than other strikers); Bower Roller Bearing Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 320 (1954) (role as in-
stigator established on basis of past role of leadership and spokesman in shop).
37 See cases cited notes 38-41 infra.
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indices such as taking a more active role in picketing,38 being the
first employees to walk out, 9 holding of an official union capacity, 0
and other specific distinguishing acts to uphold an employer's selec-
tive discharge of strike participants, even where the actual instigators
cannot be identified.41
The rationale behind the "reasonable distinction" doctrine,
which allows the employer to impose more severe sanctions upon
the most culpable strike participants, is grounded in the belief that
the employer's self-destruction should not be the cost of taking rea-
sonable steps to preserve the integrity of the no-strike clause. An
employer whose business has been damaged by an illegal strike
should not be relegated to discharge of his entire workforce as the
only means of redressing an unauthorized walkout where he cannot
specifically identify the instigators:
An employer who is the victim of such a [wildcat] strike is not re-
quired to deprive himself of the services of all employees partici-
pating in the strike .... It would be unreasonable to require the
company to terminate all guilty employees in order to sustain its
action in terminating those employees it determined were most
guilty. Any employee who participates in a strike in breach of
contract must take the gamble that at the conclusion thereof he may
not be reinstated even though those equally guilty may be.4
The imposition of heavier penalties on the more active partici-
pants in an illegal strike will discourage employees from taking a
role in a strike that will contribute to its momentum, and thus help
to curb reoccurrences. Where there is a rational basis for distin-
guishing those participants responsible for intensifying or prolong-
ing a wildcat strike, selective discharge accomplishes the legitimate
purpose of encouraging adherence to the grievance procedure agreed
to by union and management, and therefore the practice should not
be attacked as unjustifiably coercive or discriminatory. -
38 Phillips Indus. Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943 (1965); Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 Lab.
Arb. 644 (1957).
39 Insulrock Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 169 (1962).
40 Philco Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 889 (1962).
4 1 t is stated in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 29 Lab. Arb. 644 (1957) that:
It is well settled that an employer may single out for penalties the leaders of a
strike, or those who commit specific acts distinguishing them from others,
but that unless there is a reasonable basis for distinction, all must be treated
alike. Id. at 645.
42 Phillips Indus. Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943, 953-54 (1965).
43 It is true that in applying the "reasonable distinction" rule, people of equal guilt
may often receive uneven penalties. However, if the company acted in good faith and,
on the basis of all evidence at hand, felt it reacted towards the most guilty, there does
not seem to be a reason why the executed penalty should be vitiated.
19691
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D. Selective Discharge of Wildcat Strike Participants
The most difficult problem arises where, after a wildcat strike,
the employer is unable either to ascertain the identity of instigators,
or provide a rational basis for distinguishing between the participat-
ing employees. In the spontaneous and emotional atmosphere that
often erupts in a strike, it is often impossible for the employer to
sift through the fragile indications of leadership to arrive at a defin-
itive conclusion. However, the company is left with a damaging
strike, and out of a desire for industrial self-preservation wishes to
take firm action to prevent any reoccurrences. Therefore, the em-
ployer will resort to the random selection of strike participants for
discharge as a means of preventing future strikes.
In support of this position the company will present the follow-
ing argument: upon breach of the no-strike clause, it has the right
to discharge its entire work force,44 but to do so would be tanta-
mount to self-destruction, so certain employees, whose participation
in the strike is clearly established, are selected for discipline. This
power is specifically granted by the contract, and each employee
knew he was taking the risk of incurring disciplinary penalties, in-
cluding discharge, when he participated in the unauthorized walk-
out.45 To decide otherwise would be to allow employees to partici-
pate in walkouts in violation of the contract without fear of reprisal,
thereby reducing the no-strike clause to meaningless verbiage.
Despite the apparent merit of the employer's argument, the
overwhelming weight of arbitral authority stands behind the propo-
sition that participants who are equally guilty must be accorded
equal disciplinary penalties.46 Premised on the theory that merely
44 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard, 47 Lab. Arb. 752 (1966); American Air Filter Co.,
47 Lab. Arb. 129 (1966) (although discharge is not too severe a penalty, where no
degrees of guilt can be established, the employer must discharge either all or none of
the participants.); Capital Airways, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1048 (1963); Glass Container
Mfrs. Institute, 27 Lab. Arb. 131 (1956).
45 See Phillip Indus. Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943, 954 (1965).
4 6 See American Air Filter Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 129 (1966); Pullman-Standard, 47
Lab. Arb. 752 (1966); Gartland-Haswell Foundry Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 108 (1965);
Ford Motor Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 609 (1963) (selective discipline disallowed even in the
face of a contract provision giving employer authority to discharge or discipline "any
employee 'who instigates, participates in or gives leadership to an unauthorized strike
in violation of this Agreement."' Id. at 610.); Capital Airways Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 1048
(1963) (will not sustain discharge of rule violators when others have done so and are
not discharged); Metropolitan Transit Authority, 39 Lab. Arb. 849 (1962) (random
discipline violates concept of fairness, equality of treatment, and justice when conduct
of hundreds of others essentially the same); McGraw-Edison Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 76
(1962) (disparity of guilt will not allow the same penalty of discharge for all); Amer-
ican Smelting & Ref. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 575 (1959); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
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"[plarticipating in a work stoppage is not the same as instigating
a work stoppage"4 7 or actively supporting one, the weight of author-
ity holds that although mere participation subjects all to summary
discharge, where no degrees of guilt can be established, the em-
ployer must discharge all or none of the strikers.4" Selective dis-
charge under such circumstances is regarded as discriminatory,
arbitrary, and capricious.49
It is frequently the case that the employer, plagued by a succes-
sion of damaging wildcat strikes, is yet unable to identify the insti-
gators or single out the activists; and it is here that the employer's
plight is most acute. Precluded from the injunction remedy in the
courts,50 the arbitrators have rendered the employer impotent to take
any meaningful steps to vindicate the no-strike clause, for the only
effective retaliation left to the employer - discharge of his entire
work force - is patently unfeasible.
An apparently more enlightened approach would allow the em-
ployer to selectively discipline contract violators. It cannot be
doubted that the end of recurrent wildcat strikes is an absolute ne-
cessity for peace in the shop. For the company to act to guarantee
the cessation of unauthorized work stoppages is no more and no less
than the right to which it bargained. Employees should realize, as
have union and management, that the maintenance of an orderly sys-
tem of industrial self-government in a climate conducive to harmo-
nious relations between management and labor requires that disputes
29 Lab. Arb. 644 (1957) (the question of random discipline has "been answered in
the negative so many times, and so unanimously .. ." Id. at 645.); Underwood Glass
Co., 27 Lab. AMb. 614 (1956); Glass Container Mfrs. Institute, 27 Lab. AMb. 131
(1956); McLouth Steel Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 761 (1955) (regard for natural justice
goes against picking and choosing certain employees for discharge); Aleo Mfg. Co., 15
Lab. Ab. 715 (1950) (cannot discharge some and strip others of seniority as all are
equally at fault); Rheem Mfg. Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 85 (1947); Borg-Warner Corp., 4 Lab.
Ab.4 (1945).
In Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 41 Lab. AMb. 110 (1963), the contract contained, in
addition to a no-strike clause, a provision stating that "participation... not authorized
by the International ... or by [the] Agreement shall be just cause for the immediate
dismissal of any and all employees participating therein." After a work stoppage the
company discharged one of the employees involved. Despite the contract provision, the
arbitrator ordered reinstatement because the employee was a mere participant, and
others who walked out were not disciplined.
47Lone Star Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 519, 524 (1958).
48 See cases cited not 46 supra.
49A negative implication inheres in this prevailing view that punishment must al-
ways be proportionate to guilt. If an instigator can be ascertained, no participant can
be discharged since his guilt is of a lesser degree. Thus, the logic of this philosophy
leads to the situation that participants can willingly, but silently, follow a strike insti-
gator, and know that they can only receive a relatively minor disciplinary penalty.
G0 See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
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be settled through the orderly grievance procedure and not by resort
to the wildcat strike." Selective discharge which will help establish
a rational and durable collective bargaining relationship is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, but sensible.
It might be argued, with some justification, that allowing the
company such wide discretion could easily degenerate into a situa-
tion where the employer selects union activists for discharge. How-
ever, if an employee has reason to believe he was dismissed for his
union activities rather than for strike participation, the safeguards
provided by the National Labor Relations Act5" are still available
to him. To avoid unfair labor practice charges, the company would
have to provide some basis other than union activity for imposing
unequal sanctions on strike participants. For example, the selective
discipline of employees with poor work records, or less seniority
might be reasonable criteria where there is no way to ascertain de-
grees of participation in the work stoppage.
In truth, if the policy of the National Labor Relations Act were
to protect any employee engaged in concerted action, even where the
activity is proscribed in a collective bargaining agreement, then the
Supreme Court decisions favoring arbitration and the implementa-
tion of the no-strike clause would be inconsistent with the Act.53 A
more realistic interpretation would easily reconcile Court decisions
favoring the no-strike clause with the policy of the Act by conclud-
ing that the right to strike, indispensable to the function of collec-
tive bargaining, is a disruptive influence once a contract with a
grievance procedure has been set up by the mutual consent of the
parties. Thus, where the right to strike has served its function by
producing a contract with favorable terms and has been temporarily
waived in the interest of securing an orderly process of dispute reso-
lution throughout the duration of the contract, selective discharge,
where necessary to make the no-strike pledge meaningful, would not
offend the policy thrust of the National Labor Relations Act.
Some arbitrators have adhered to the selective discipline doc-
trine, 4 although often because they determined that any discretion
51 It is, of course, not suggested that any employee be required to stay on the job and
rely on the grievance procedure in a situation where unsafe and hazardous conditions
are prevalent in the shop.
5229 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1964).
5 3 See text accompanying notes 4-6, 32-34 supra.
54 See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 487 (1968); Ross Gear Tennessee Plant,
45 Lab. Arb. 959 (1965) (provision for selective discipline upheld, although this does
not preclude investigation into fairness of particular penalty); Okonite Co., 37 Lab.
Arb. 977 (1961); L.B. Jones Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 590 (1960) (would not grant rein-
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they had was removed by specific contractual language which gave
the employer an absolute privilege to impose random discipline once
participation with a wildcat strike was established.55 Recently, how-
ever, at least one arbitrator has responded to the employer's plight by
accepting selective discipline of strikers as a proper sanction. In a
recent decision, Ingersoll-Rand Co.,56 the arbitrator provided an in-
cisive analysis, upholding selective desciplineY7  Recognizing the
employer's need to insure compliance with the grievance procedure
and the importance of preventing employees from flouting the es-
tablished channels of dispute resolution by taking the law into their
own hands, the arbitrator sustained the employer's selective disci-
pline of strike participants,58 condemning the wildcat strike as "one
of the most serious acts of industrial misconduct."59  In order to
live up to its responsibilties to both customers and employees, firm
and prompt discipline is needed since "[tihe removal of dangerous
offenders from the industrial community not only discourages seri-
ous misconduct by others, thereby achieving prevention, but also is
a simple act of self defense for the business as a whole."'60 The
purpose of the labor agreement and the grievance procedure, cul-
minating in arbitration, is to secure a period of uninterrupted pro-
statement to 10 wildcat strike participants where there was no evidence of discrimina-
tion against them due to their union membership); Vickers, Inc., 33 Lab. MAb. 594
(1959) (discipline for participation upheld even though employee opposed strike and
only went because others did - the arbitrator called his joining in an indication of "an
attitude of disloyalty both to the Company and to the Union." Id. at 604.); Wolff Shoe
Mfg. Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 568 (1959); National Lock Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1194 (1949);
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 5 Lab. Arb. 363 (1946) ('"The mere fact that there may
have been other employees who may have been equally guilty does not make the act
of the company discriminatory." Id. at 368.).
55 For example, in National Lock Co., 12 Lab. Ab. 1194 (1947), the contract
empowered the employer to discharge any employee who participated in a strike in vio-
lation of the no-strike clause. After an illegal strike, the employer exercised his powers
reserved in the contract and discharged several participants at random. Noting that the
penalties imposed for mere participation were harsh, the arbitrator upheld the discharges
stating that the sweeping contract provision had deprived him of authority to disturb
the employer's action.
Also, in Okonite Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 977, 980 (1961), the arbitrator recognized the
majority view that "Iflair play requires equality of treatment for all members of a
group," but felt that under a contract giving the company the right to discipline "any
and all" employees, the management was in a "technically unassailable position." Id.
lu50 Lab. Arb. 487 (1968).
57 It should be noted that the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to arbitration
decisions, and that therefore Ingersoll-Rand is effective only as an able argument for a
minority view.
587Te penalties imposed ran the gamut from discharge to lengthy suspension.
59 50 Lab. Mrb. at 493.
60 Id. at 493.
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duction,6' without which the business cannot prosper and the
workers cannot expect fringe benefits or fair play on the part of
management. Holding that the employees were adequately pro-
tected from employer abuse by the grievance procedure itself, the
arbitrator noted that the only ones who gain by the wildcat strike
are the employer's competitors, since a company with a reputation
for chronic delays in making deliveries due to repeated work stop-
pages inevitably loses customers.62 The rationale behind selective
discipline seems neither discriminatory nor arbitrary where
the Company often does not have sufficient proof or finds itself
in the position where if it were to discipline all those involved, it
might seriously interfere with production and punish itself as well
as those of its employees who were innocent of having any part
in the illegal work stoppage.63
Although on the surface the process of selective discipline may ap-
pear arbitrary since unequal penalties will often be exacted upon
those of equal guilt, the procedure cannot be attacked as unjust for
"under such circumstances, it is inevitable that some of the guilty
'get away with it' hopefully having learned a lesson from their
'lucky break' ".64
When the gravity of the employer's predicament is viewed in the
perspective of the strong national policy endorsing mandatory arbi-
tration and the companion no-strike clause as pillars of industrial
stability, it can only be hoped that in the future more arbitrators will
follow the lead of the Ingersoll-Rand decision and approve selective
discharge as an appropriate solution to the wildcat strike.
III. REALITIES OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Some might argue that the company is adequately protected from
an illegal strike by the right to bring an action for money damages
under section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act.65 In reality,
damages seem an inadequate remedy since it is virtually impossible
for the employer to accurately assess the damages caused by a wild-
cat strike. Furthermore, "the best interests of labor-management





6529 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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sue a union consisting of his employees."66  Also, damages are a
hollow reward to the company whose business is ruined due to cus-
tomers lost as a result of debilitating work stoppages. Finally, dam-
ages are obtainable not against the individual employees who fo-
mented the strike, but against the union which is often as blameless
as the employer.
A contract provision that would itself establish the disciplinary
penalties to be exacted on wildcat strikers, giving the employer the
power to selectively implement them, might present an effective al-
ternative to selective discharge. The clause might provide for a loss
of seniority, pension, or vacation benefits. Possibly, the dispute
which caused the walk-out should be considered no longer eligible
for the grievance procedure, no matter how meritorious.
All contract proposals, however, no matter how attractive are
subject to the political realities of the shop. It is hard to imagine
that a union representative, dependent upon the bargaining unit for
his continuance in office, would ever arrive at an agreement giving
the company automatic authority to exact a penalty upon an employee
without review. On the other hand, the company might also be re-
luctant to enter such an agreement where it would amount to a for-
feiture of the right to discharge for cause, even in situations where
discharge is wholly warranted. Thus, when the alternative solutions
to the wildcat strike are subjected to dose scrutiny, it becomes abun-
dantly dear that the solutions offered by the judicial process and
arbitration remain the most realistic.
IV. CONCLUSION
The desire on the part of both management and union alike is
to avoid the wildcat strike, one of the most serious industrial of-
fenses, and to resort to the grievance procedure as the sole means
of dispute settling.67  However, the employer has been faced with
a situation where due to the decisions of courts and arbitrators, he
can neither enjoin a stoppage and resume production, nor selectively
discharge employees who participated in the walkout and thus stem
off repeated incidents.6" Confining themselves to a narrow literal
66 Comment, Injunctive Relief for Breach of a No-Strike Clause: Enforcement of
the No-Strike Clause, 18 WAsH. &. LEE L. REv. 329, 334 (1961). See also Comment,
supra note 19, at 634.
67A great number of collective bargaining contracts contain grievance procedures
which state that the grievance procedure shall be the sole means of settling a dispute or
controversy arising under the contract.
6 8 In fact, it is often the case that wildcat strikes are not isolated incidents. The
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reading of the statutes,69 the courts have abandoned their earlier con-
cern for an orderly system of self-government based on a mutual
compliance with contract requirements.70 Under the elusive concepts
of fairness and equality, which are virtually impossible to define, the
arbitrators have constructed a system where the employer is often
faced with the meaningless choice of discharging all of the strike
participants, which would damage the company even further, or dis-
missing none of them.
Change is needed and should come, first in the form of legisla-
tive action which will clarify the meaning of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in the light of section 301 and allow injunctions
against wildcat strikes in either federal or state courts.7'1 Arbitrators
should accept the doctrine of selective discharge (or discipline) of
wildcat strikers, once their participation is dearly established. Until
these steps are taken the no-strike provision will not be the corner-
stone of a rational and durable collective bargaining relationship,
as was intended. Unless the employer is granted the power to re-
spond meaningfully to an illegal work stoppage, the wildcat strike
will remain the employer's dilemma.
JEFFREY L. KLEIN
same companies are hit with them repeatedly, particularly where the unauthorized walk-
out has proved a highly successful method of unlawful coercion.
6 9 See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
7 o See text accompanying note 5 supra.
71 An alternative to outright repeal of Norris-LaGuardia as applied to section 301
suits would be legislation that would reverse Avco and prohibit removal under section
1441. However, such a solution would fly in the face of the need for a uniform na-
tional labor policy, and thus would not be advisable. See note 31 supra.
